For Whistleblowers

You are not alone. And you do not have to stay silent.

Hundreds of staffers across the FBI, DOJ, SDNY, USVI AG, Palm Beach PD, the Metropolitan Police, and agencies across Europe have handled pieces of this case. Many saw how investigations were stalled, evidence was buried, and powerful people were protected. Some of you are still inside those institutions.

We do not know which media owners, which editors, which publishers are themselves entangled in the networks these documents expose. We cannot tell you which newsroom is safe. What we can tell you is this: you do not have to go through a newsroom at all.

If you believe the right thing to do — for the victims, for the public, for a society that cannot function when its institutions protect criminals — is to share what you know, we can help you do it safely.

You do not have to prove who you are. You do not have to provide your name, your rank, or your agency. You can share a single detail, a single document, or a single account of what you witnessed. Every piece matters. The corpus is 1.38 million documents — your piece may be the one that completes the picture.

Read this page first. Protect yourself. Then reach out.

Before You Do Anything

The people involved in this story have resources, lawyers, and surveillance capabilities. Protecting yourself is not optional.

1. Do not tell anyone

Not your partner. Not your best friend. Not your therapist. Not yet. The single biggest risk to whistleblowers is not technical — it is social. Every person you tell is a potential subpoena target, a potential leak, and a potential witness against you. You can involve lawyers and journalists later, on your terms, through secure channels.

2. Do not use your personal devices

Your phone, laptop, and tablet are tracking devices. They log your location, your browsing history, your keystrokes, and your network connections. Employers and law enforcement can subpoena all of it.

What to use instead:

• Buy a cheap laptop with cash from a store you don’t normally visit. Do not bring your phone with you when you buy it.
• Install Tails OS on a USB stick — it runs entirely in memory, leaves no trace on the computer, and routes all traffic through Tor. Download it from tails.net on a public computer.
• If you must use a phone, buy a prepaid burner with cash. Never power it on at home or work. Never insert your real SIM. Never connect to your home WiFi.

3. Do not use your home or work network

Your ISP logs every connection. Your employer’s IT department sees everything. Coffee shop WiFi with security cameras is also risky.

What to use instead:

• A public WiFi network you don’t regularly use — a library, a cafe in a different neighbourhood, a hotel lobby
• Always use Tor Browser or Tails OS even on public WiFi — the network operator can see you connected, but not what you did
• Never access personal accounts (email, social media, banking) from the same session or device you use for this

4. Strip metadata from every file

Every document, photo, and video carries hidden metadata: your name, your device serial number, GPS coordinates, timestamps, software version. This must be removed before sending anything.

How to strip metadata:

• On any computer: install exiftool and run exiftool -all= filename — this removes all metadata
• On Tails OS: right-click any file and select “Remove metadata” (built-in)
• For PDFs: use qpdf --linearize input.pdf output.pdf or print-to-PDF from a viewer
• Always verify after stripping: run exiftool filename and check the output is clean

5. Prepare your materials carefully

• Make copies of everything before you begin. Store originals in a safe location not connected to you.
• Redact anything that identifies you specifically (handwriting, employee IDs, email headers with your name) unless that information is itself the evidence.
• If you are sending scanned documents, use a scanner or copier that is not registered to you or your workplace. Library scanners work.
• Organise materials with brief, factual descriptions. Context helps us verify and publish faster.

6. Assume you are being monitored

If you work for or with any person or institution named in the Epstein files, act on the assumption that your communications are monitored. This is not paranoia — it is the documented reality of how powerful institutions respond to whistleblowers.

• Do not change your routine suddenly. Keep using your normal devices normally.
• Do all secure activities in separate sessions, on separate devices, from separate locations.
• If anyone asks about the Epstein files, do not react differently than you would have before deciding to act.

When you are ready, visit our Contact page for secure submission channels.

If You Are in Immediate Danger

If you believe you are in physical danger because of what you know:

• National Whistleblower Center: whistleblowers.org — legal resources and protection
• Government Accountability Project: whistleblower.org — legal defense for whistleblowers
• Press Freedom Foundation: freedom.press — if you want to go to established media

These organisations have legal teams experienced in protecting sources. Contact them through Tor.

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